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Abstract 
Since the unrest in Mali in 2012, the European Union (EU) has become heavily engaged 
in the stability of the country, where today two Common Security and Defence Policy 
missions and a range of EU security, development and governance tools are 
deployed. This commitment, combined with the deep-seated security problems in 
Mali, necessitates using various EU instruments coherently, particularly in light of the so-
called integrated approach in the EU Global Strategy. This paper explores how 
effective the EU has been in acting cohesively and strategically, taking an ‘integrated 
approach’ to conflict. It assesses the EU’s integrated approach in Mali through three 
lenses: civil-military synergies, the security-development nexus and a ‘multi-phased’ 
approach. It argues that meaningful synergies are being created, particularly 
between security and development actions. However, amalgamating EU tools 
through innovations such as the Programme of support for enhanced security in the 
Mopti and Gao regions and for the management of border areas (PARSEC) and 
operational actions under Article 28 TEU has become an end in itself – a ‘laboratory of 
experimentation’ for the EU – rather than a means to tackle underlying instability in 
Mali. This is not what the integrated approach aims to achieve and there is instead a 
focus on implementing ad hoc programmes without a long-term plan for the future of 
the country, behind which all EU tools can unite. This is damaging not just for Mali but 









For nearly a decade, the European Union (EU) has become heavily invested in the 
security of Mali. Since the uprising following the 2012 coup, the EU has operationalised 
nearly every available security and development tool. As one EU official expressed: 
“We have every single instrument in motion in Mali. Every time there is a new initiative, 
a new idea, we always pick Mali.”1 There is one military and one civilian Common 
Security and Defence (CSDP) mission in the country, 14 projects funded by the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and 12 projects of the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) worth over €209.5 million, alongside other 
European Development Fund (EDF) funds.2 There is an EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) to the Sahel who focuses to a great extent on Mali, and the country also hosts 
an Article 28 TEU ‘stabilisation action’. This action, with a legal basis in the TEU, was 
implemented in the Mopti and Segou regions in 2017 and deployed a team of experts 
to help the Malian authorities re-establish security and governance reform. 
Yet in utilising such a range of instruments, it must be asked how effective the 
EU has been in acting cohesively and strategically, and in what ways it has thus taken 
an ‘integrated approach’ to conflict. This is the question this paper explores. It finds 
that the EU has made crucial institutional innovations to integrate its crisis 
management instruments in Mali, creating new synergies particularly between 
security and development tools. Nevertheless, these synergies do not reflect the full 
ambition of the integrated approach in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS).3 While EU 
action in Mali is becoming more integrated in its operational procedures, the EU is 
failing both to articulate a long-term strategy for Mali’s future and, consequently, to 
have a clear impact. The process of amalgamating EU external action tools has 
become an end in itself − a ‘laboratory of experimentation’ for EU crisis management 
− rather than means to tackle instability in Mali.4 
                                                 
1 Interview with EU official 1, Brussels, 8 March 2019.  
2 “Mali”, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, retrieved 12 April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/mali. 
3 European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for 
the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, Brussels, June 2016. 
4 B. Venturi, “The EU and the Sahel: A Laboratory of Experimentation for the Security–Migration–
Development Nexus”, IAI Working Papers, no. 38, Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 
2017. 
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A central question is thus how to measure the success of the EU in implementing 
the integrated approach. There are two ways to do so, based on the concept’s 
development. The first criterion is the extent to which the EU’s tools and instruments 
have become more integrated, overcoming sectoral silos to produce outcomes of 
added value. This examines the operational side, where the EU has been most 
successful and real institutional innovations have been made, such as staff of the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 
(DG DEVCO) and of the CSDP missions working together on projects. However, a 
second, more stringent criterion measures the EU’s success against its substantive 
aims. The integrated approach is a means to set higher ambitions for EU crisis 
management. This criterion thus assesses whether the integration of tools has enabled 
the EU to become more strategic as an actor, mobilising all of its instruments and tools 
to achieve long-term stability in a country or region. This is where this paper finds that 
the EU has not been so successful, indeed many EU actors in Mali have seen fulfilling 
the first criterion as an end in itself.  
These findings underline an important distinction underappreciated in the 
literature. Lopez Lucia has argued that scholars tend to focus only on the operational, 
rather than the ‘political’ aspects of the previous comprehensive approach.5 In this 
sense, the comprehensive approach and the Sahel Strategy are more than just action 
plans, but ways of “performing the international agency of the EU”.6 Lopez Lucia 
touches on a crucial problem in EU external action; often the EU prioritises its 
operational unity as a crisis manager, neglecting longer-term goals of achieving 
peace or stability. This problem recurred in the interviews conducted for this study. 
This paper will first operationalise the integrated approach conceptually and 
justify its significance in Mali, before putting three key aspects of the integrated 
approach under the microscope. The first section will explore EU civil-military synergies, 
the second section will analyse the success of the security-development nexus, and 
the final section will examine the ‘multi-phased’ aspect of the integrated approach 
which aims to synchronise action at all stages of the conflict cycle. The conclusions 
explore lessons the EU can draw from its experience in Mali as a global security actor.  
                                                 
5 E. Lopez Lucia, “Performing EU Agency by Experimenting the ‘Comprehensive Approach’: 
The European Union Sahel Strategy”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, 




Framework of analysis: Integrating ambition  
The term ‘integrated approach’ is not new. It has been used in relation to United 
Nations ‘integrated missions’ which place all political, humanitarian, security and 
development action under one mission structure.7 This same aim was reflected in the 
EU’s comprehensive approach, articulated in a 2013 Joint Communication which 
states: “comprehensiveness refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU 
instruments and resources but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and 
member states”.8 Yet the ‘integrated approach’ was not introduced in the EU until 
the 2016 EUGS, when the comprehensive approach was broadened:  
Implementing the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ through a 
coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal is essential. But the meaning and 
scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded.9  
In what way was the comprehensive approach expanded? When Federica 
Mogherini became High Representative (HR/VP), she increased the ambitions for the 
EU as a strategic actor.10 The underlying aim of the EUGS, which birthed the integrated 
approach, was to unite all spheres of EU action under common aims, mitigating 
previous, sectorally siloed thinking: “shared vision, common action”.11 The EUGS 
aspired for the EU to become more effective as a crisis manager, less “reactive and 
events-driven”, and to prioritise areas where it could improve long-term stability.12  
Reflecting this, the integrated approach is more ambitious than the 
comprehensive approach in three ways. First, the integrated approach works towards 
creating active synergies between EU tools, not simply the division of labour. This 
particularly concerns synergies between EU security and development instruments 
and civil and military actions. Synergies mean more than just improved coordination 
and coherence, but creating results that could not have been achieved had both 
                                                 
7 T. Tardy, “The EU: From Comprehensive Vision to Integrated Action”, Issue Brief, no. 5, EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, February 2017, p. 2. 
8 European Commission & High Representative, Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council: The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and 
Crises, JOIN(2013) 30, Brussels, 11 December 2013, p. 3. 
9 European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action, op. cit., p. 9. 
10 N. Tocci, “Towards an EU Global Strategy”, in A. Missiroli (ed.), Towards an EU Global Strategy: 
Background, Process, References, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, September 2015, p. 
115. 
11 European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action, op. cit., p. 3. 
12 Ibid., p. 5. 
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actors worked separately. In contrast, the comprehensive approach was less 
ambitious. The Joint Communication emphasises the need to use “in a coherent 
manner, different tools and instruments within their own mandates and decision-
making processes”.13 The CSDP actions were framed as short-term tools and 
development tools as long-term.14 Yet the integrated approach abolished the siloed 
long-term/short-term distinction of security/development instruments.15  
Second, the integrated approach aims to expand the EU’s role and establish 
its presence as a security actor at all stages of a conflict. While a need for the EU to 
focus more on the prevention stage was highlighted in 2013, it became an 
indispensable element of the integrated approach. Over half of the 2018 Council 
Conclusions on the Integrated Approach were dedicated to integrating EU action 
throughout the various phases of a conflict.16 As mentioned, the distinction between 
short-term ‘security’ tools and long-term ‘development’ tools disappeared in favour 
of integrating all tools at all stages.  
Building on these expansions, a third shift was the increased ambition for the 
integrated approach to make the EU a more effective, strategic security actor with 
an overarching direction to guide action at all conflict phases.17 A 2018 EEAS working 
paper shows this: 
The EU integrated approach is a new way of working which aims at setting a 
clear overarching EU political objective which can be achieved by using and 
combining the different tools at our disposal.18 
Table 1 illustrates this shift from ‘comprehensive’ to ‘integrated’. 
 
  
                                                 
13 European Commission & High Representative, Joint Communication, op. cit., p. 8 [emphasis 
added]. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External 
Conflicts and Crises, Brussels, 22 January 2018, p. 3. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Tardy, “The EU”, op. cit., p. 3. 
18 European External Action Service, “The EU Integrated Approach in the Sahel”, EEAS Working 
Paper, Brussels, 8 February 2018, p. 2. 
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Table 1: The EU’s conceptual shift in approach to managing fragile conflict areas 
 Comprehensive approach Integrated approach 
How do different 
instruments work 
together? 
Division of labour  
Specialisation of instruments 
by task 
All tools working together in all 
areas at all stages, towards a 
unified goal 
What is the aspired 
outcome? 
Instruments are ‘joined up’ 
and coordinated, avoiding 
duplication 
Instruments combining to 
producing an outcome of added 
value  




Given that this conceptual transition is comparatively recent, the number of conflict 
zones where this approach has been put into practice is limited, which makes Mali 
particularly important as an example. 
 
Case selection  
Mali is an ideal case study to evaluate the EU’s integrated approach in a third country 
since there is maximum EU engagement in the sphere of crisis management. First, due 
to the number of instruments operationalised, it has the potential to indicate the kinds 
of problems the EU may face when engaging many different instruments in a single 
conflict zone in the future. As highlighted earlier, there are two CSDP missions in Mali, 
one military, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali which began in February 
2013, and one civilian, the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel 
Mali which began in April 2014. Nearly every EU financial instrument is in use, from 14 
IcSP projects to the EDF and the African Peace Facility (APF) to 12 national EUTF 
projects worth over €209.5 million.19 The EU remains the largest donor to Mali where 
member states and the EU together provide around €660 million per year.20 A team 
of experts have been deployed to stabilise Mali under Article 28 TEU and there is a 
EUSR to the Sahel who focuses to a significant extent on Mali.  
Second, Mali is also a relevant case study for the integrated approach 
because of conditions on the ground; there is a pressing need for the EU to take an 
                                                 
19 “Mali”, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, retrieved 12 April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/mali. 
20 “The European Union and the Sahel, Fact Sheet”, European External Action Service, 2 June 
2017, retrieved 5 April 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headQuarters-homepage/ 
4099/european-union-and-sahel-fact-sheet_en. 
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integrated approach in responding to instability in Mali. On the one hand, the 
violence in Mali is deep-rooted, touching on all aspects of society.21 Terrorism, drug 
smuggling and human trafficking are symptoms of entrenched problems, and for the 
EU to act effectively in creating lasting stability it needs to devise a long-term strategy 
integrating security, development and governance. On the other hand, an 
integrated approach is also necessary due to strong member state interests. Mali is 
relevant as a ‘country of origin’ – Malians frequently cross into France and Italy.22 
France has also made extensive counterterrorism efforts through Operation Barkhane. 
Due to these factors, Mali has long been a focus of attempts to articulate a strategy 
to bring these interests together. The 2011 Sahel Strategy was the first such attempt at 
a comprehensive approach, a new way to integrate security, governance and 
development in the region.23 Four years later, the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-
2020 built on these aims. Thus, not only is Mali home to the highest number of 
operational EU external peace and security tools, but it is also the country with the 
EU’s longest-standing commitment to achieving an integrated approach.  
The success of the EU in implementing an integrated approach will be assessed 
in the following sections through civil-military synergies, the security-development 
nexus and the EU’s multi-phased action throughout the conflict cycle in Mali. These 
are the three key areas where there are significant gaps between different siloes of 
the EU external crisis management architecture in terms of organisational cultures, 
priorities and institutional procedures. Furthermore, these three aspects have been 
identified by the EU, in strategic documents, as areas that the integrated approach 
should target.  
 
Civil-military synergies and CSDP missions: Integrated capacity building in Mali 
The first element to examine is the foundation of EU integrated action in Mali: civil-
military coordination between EUCAP Sahel Mali and the EU Delegation on the civilian 
side and EUTM Mali on the military side. Civil-military relations were highlighted in the 
comprehensive approach as based on information sharing and coordination to avoid 
                                                 
21 “Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali”, International Crisis Group, Report, 
no. 267, 13 December 2018, retrieved 24 April 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/ 
mali/267-narcotrafic-violence-et-politique-au-nord-du-mali. 
22 European Commission, Migration Profile: Mali, end 2016, Brussels, 2017.  
23 D. Helly & G. Galeazzi, “Avant la Lettre? The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crises in the 
Sahel”, Briefing Note, no. 75, Maastricht, ECDPM, February 2015, p. 2. 
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duplication.24 However, the integrated approach, as Lintern argues, is more 
ambitious.25 The EUGS expanded the meaning of civil-military synergies from 
coordination to “a single external policy”.26 Civilian and military missions thus become 
a subset of overall EU foreign policy which necessitates working together on jointly-
produced outcomes.27  
The civilian and military CSDP missions in Mali both aim to improve the Malian 
authorities’ capacity in the security sector, yet barriers to coordination can be 
substantial.28 While EUTM Mali focuses on developing the Malian Armed Forces, 
EUCAP Sahel Mali concentrates on the reform of internal security forces. However, to 
maximise their impact, both missions need to work together, and with the EU 
Delegation, toward common goals. Yet the contrasting organisational cultures of 
these actors is the main obstacle to meaningful EU civil-military synergies. Civilian CSDP 
missions are police, judicial staff and gendarmes. The EU Delegation is comprised of 
civil servants who coordinate development projects and conduct diplomacy. Military 
CSDP missions work with national chains of command. Bridging this gap to create 
added value is thus particularly challenging. 
The informal mechanisms of cooperation between EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel 
Mali and the EU Delegation are strong. The political advisors (PolAds) to the Heads of 
the CSDP missions, the Head of Delegation and to the EUSR are key bridging actors. 
PolAds are mandated to report to the Heads of Mission and offer guidance on the 
overall direction of the mission, using their detailed knowledge of the strategic 
situation on the ground. The EU has expanded training courses allowing civilian and 
military political advisors to create networks that facilitate the sharing of information.29 
PolAds help create trust between different siloes of EU action, given that mutual 
suspicion can pose a key obstacle to civil-military relations. Vogelaar has highlighted 
                                                 
24 S. Jayasundara-Smits, “Civil-Military Synergy at Operational Level in EU External Action”, Best 
Practices Report: Civil-Military Synergies, Deliverable 4.11, WOSCAP, 30 November 2016, p. 4. 
25 S. Lintern, “What Civilian-Military Synergies?”, in T. Tardy (ed.), Recasting EU Civilian Crisis 
Management, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2017, pp. 35-40. 
26 Ibid., p. 35. 
27 Ibid., p. 37. 
28 G. Vogelaar, “Local Ownership, Inclusivity and Civil-Military Synergy in EU External Action: The 
Case of EU Support to Security Sector Reforms in Mali”, Journal of Regional Security, 
ResearchGate, 2018, p. 1. 
29 “ESDC: Training for Political Advisors”, European Union External Action Service, 23 February 
2017, retrieved 4 April 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage_en/§21285/ESDC:%20training%20for%20Political%20Advisors. 
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the obstacle of mistrust posed to information sharing between civilian and military 
actors; not knowing “how information will be used, what information is collected and 
how”.30 Interviewees for this study, in contrast, highlighted the frequency of interaction 
and trust built between PolAds in the CSDP missions in Mali and the EU Delegation.31 
On a weekly basis PolAds coordinate on their respective objectives for the week and 
their key challenges.32 
Formal synergies between the two CSDP missions and between EUTM Mali and 
the EU Delegation have also grown. Interviewees highlighted the EUTF frontier projects 
as the best example of formal civil-military synergies. Notably, the €29 million 
Programme of support for enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions and for 
the management of border areas (PARSEC) programme is a concrete example of 
civil-military synergies on the ground.33 It is one of the largest EUTF programmes in Mali 
and draws on the advice of personnel from both CSDP missions, the EU Delegation 
and Expertise France, a French public agency which supports the EU in the 
implementation of their development policies at the technical level.34 PARSEC was 
set up to train internal security forces and construct infrastructure to improve security 
in central Mali after instability in 2015, as well as helping the Malian government 
manage security in border areas.35 It drew on the respective strengths of civil and 
military partners. For instance, EUTM Mali coordinated the operation of PARSEC’s aerial 
border surveillance contribution above the Niger river.36  
More generally, interviewees identified the EUTF as a key area where civilian 
and military actors are building synergies in Mali. Yet the ways in which they help the 
EU meet its goal of stabilising Mali in the long term, or their strategic impact, has been 
limited. This is partly due to limitations within the CSDP missions themselves but also due 
                                                 
30 Vogelaar, op. cit., p. 15. 
31 Interview with a former EU advisor, Geneva, 5 March 2019, interview with an EU official, 
Brussels, 19 March 2019. 
32 Interview with a former EU advisor, Geneva, 5 March 2019. 
33 “Document d’action du Fonds Fiduciaire de l’UE à utiliser pour les décisions du comité de 
gestion”, retrieved 26 April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-
eutf-sah-ml-06.pdf, p. 1. 
34 Ibid., p. 3. 
35 “PARSEC : contribuer au renforcement de la sécurité et de la gestion des frontières au Mali”, 
Expertise France, 21 March 2019, retrieved 4 May 2019, https://www.expertisefrance.fr/fiche-
projet?id=404281.  
36 “La surveillance aérienne dans la cadre du programme PARSEC au centre du Mali”, EUTM 
Mali, 3 April 2019, retrieved 29 April 2019, http://www.eutmmali.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
09/NWSL0917-A3-FR-2.pdf, p. 2. 
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to the lack of a clear set of long-term goals for security and development tools to work 
towards. Cooperation largely takes place on an ad hoc basis via short-term migration-
focused projects.  
 
Structural limitations on civil-military synergies 
There are key shortcomings internally within EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and the EU 
Delegation that limit the impact of civil-military synergies on the long-term reform of 
the Malian security sector. First, the EUTM Mali commander’s tenure is only six months, 
making it difficult to create long-term synergies. Interviewees described the disorienta-
tion of generals from EU member states upon their arrival in Mali.37 Within their six-
month rotation, it could take three months for personnel to adapt to the EUTM 
environment before even considering how coordination with actors such as the EU 
Delegation might be improved.38 This made the creation of civil-military synergies and 
EUCAP-EU Delegation-EUTM relationships reliant on an informal network of PolAds.  
Second, regarding EUCAP Sahel Mali, staff are mostly seconded from national 
administrations of EU member states. These personnel do not stay more than two years 
and there are often issues with human resources management, which the EU has 
recognised as a fundamental problem for civilian missions: member states often do 
not send staff with the right skills for the mission.39 As one interviewee phrased it: “we 
get the pre-retirees or the bad apples”.40 EUCAP Sahel Mali staff tended to have 
specific knowledge of a narrow area such as the gendarmes but cannot see the 
bigger picture.41 As a result, they have been criticised for giving advice that is often 
technical rather than strategic.42 Consequently, EUCAP Sahel Mali increasingly 
focused on implementing small projects rather than forging links with other actors. 
Given the difficulty of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the length of time it takes to 
                                                 
37 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 19 March 2019; interview with a former EU advisor, 
Geneva, 5 March 2019. 
38 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 19 March 2019.  
39 European Parliament, Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), A. Creta, A. di 
Martino, M. Nemedi & P. Taitto (rapporteurs), Civilian and Military Personnel in CSDP Missions 
and Operations, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/2016/02, Brussels, 16 February 2017, p. 16. 
40 Interview, former EU advisor, Geneva, 5 March 2019. 
41 Ibid. 
42 A. Lebovich, “Halting Ambition: EU Migration and Security Policy in the Sahel”, ECFR Policy 
Brief, no. 266, London, European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2018, p. 10. 
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see results, interviewees stressed that personnel valued executing a short-term project 
with more tangible outcomes more than working towards long-term reform.43  
From the start, the level of strategic ambition in the creation of civil-military 
synergies was limited by short-term mandates and a projects-based approach in 
EUCAP Sahel Mali. The EU Delegation suffered from a lack of staff to help implement 
civil-military synergies.44 These structural problems were particularly evident during the 
implementation of PARSEC, which involved EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and the EU 
Delegation. Other than the PolAds, personnel in the CSDP missions struggled to see 
the bigger strategic picture and the importance of these synergies.45 PARSEC and 
EUCAP Sahel Mali began to perceive each other as competitors.46 EUCAP Sahel Mali 
was already over-burdened and did not understand the relevance of EUTF projects 
to their work.47 Consequently during the first two years of PARSEC, Expertise France, 
which implemented the project, was unable to draw on the expertise from either of 
the CSDP missions, which led to complaints from the Malians that this was affecting 
the impact of the project on the ground.48 
 
PARSEC: An ad-hoc projects approach to civil-military synergies? 
Thus, despite being able to facilitate powerful new civil-military synergies, PARSEC was 
intrinsically limited in strategic ambition as an ‘emergency’-focused project. Despite 
the project having been given the green light in 2016, it can claim few concrete 
achievements. First, the Malians were disappointed with the progress of PARSEC and 
complained directly to Brussels.49 The still unstable security situation in the centre of 
the country made communication with the Malian authorities difficult and meant that 
European trainers on the programme had to be removed from the area.50 PARSEC 
was mobilised without taking into account conditions on the ground.51 Second, as an 
EUTF programme, PARSEC is not ‘integrated’ in that it stands outside CSDP frameworks 
                                                 
43 Interview with a former EU advisor, Geneva, 5 March 2019.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 E. Lopez Lucia, “The European Union Integrated Approach Towards the Sahel”, Centre 
FrancoPaix en résolution des conflits et missions de paix, Québec, Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en 
études stratégiques et diplomatiques Université du Québec à Montréal, February 2019, p. 40. 
47 Ibid., p. 38. 
48 Ibid. pp. 37-38. 
49 Ibid., p. 38. 




and long-term development instruments. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa itself 
contains the word ‘emergency’ in its name; it does not have long-term ambitions.52 It 
arose from the 2015 Valetta Summit, which intended to tackle the causes of migration 
from countries of origin.53 PARSEC is limited geographically to Mali’s Mopti and Gao 
regions. Substantively, it has a mandate focused on border management and 
preventing trafficking rather than long-term good-governance goals.54 Border 
surveillance hardly tackles the structural problems at the root of violence. The EUTF 
mixes short-term security actions like border management and long-term human 
security and development goals. However, this mixture makes PARSEC a standalone 
programme tackling the symptoms (such as trafficking) not the causes of fragility.  
Overall, valuable civil-military synergies have been created, notably through 
PARSEC that draws personnel from EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and the EU 
Delegation under the EUTF umbrella. However, intra-EU civil-military synergies have 
been limited in scope due to structural limitations on CSDP missions and the ad hoc 
nature of PARSEC as a response to the ‘migration crisis’. This highlights a crucial 
problem: synergies at the operational level are seen by many as ends in themselves. 
Interviewees were surprisingly relaxed about the extent to which projects such as 
PARSEC succeeded.55 There was a greater focus on how well this programme 
presented the EU as a united front for the Malians, and to gain the EU the “political 
leverage that we needed at the [Malian] Ministry of Security”.56 There was little 
consideration for the lack of an integrated long-term goal towards which civilian and 
military actors should work, or tackling the roots of instability as the EU promised.  
Civil-military synergies form the most basic tenets of the EU’s integrated 
approach to conflict. Yet another significant sectoral gulf has long existed between 
the EU’s security and development instruments, each with their own organisational 
culture and practices.  
                                                 
52 Conversation with a policy expert via telephone, 4 April 2019. 
53 European Commission, The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and 
Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa: Strategic 
Orientation Document, Brussels, 16 February 2016, p. 1. 
54 “Programme of support for enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions and for the 
management of border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)”, European Commission, retrieved 21 April 
2019, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/programme-support-enhanced-security-
mopti-and-gao-regions-and-management-border-areas_en. 
55 Interview with a former EU advisor, Geneva, 5 March 2019; interview with an EU official, 
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The security-development nexus 
Merging security and development elements of external action is crucial to the EU’s 
integrated approach.57 The nexus between EU security and development actors, 
especially DG DEVCO, pushes the EU to act in a more cohesive way and integrates 
the Commission into the security domain. In Mali, the nexus relates to securitising 
development instruments like the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and 
the EDF which funds security-related programmes such as the APF. The IcSP is also 
used to help stabilise war-torn countries and through Article 3 it contributes to short-
term stabilisation activities.58 EUTF development programmes play an equally crucial 
role. 
The 2005 European Consensus on Development, as well as its updated 2017 
version, articulated the need for a security-development nexus: “Without peace and 
security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without 
development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur.”59 There is a 
clear internal logic to this nexus within the EU: it is not motivated only by needs on the 
ground, but it is a continuation of integrated thinking in EU external action. Merging 
security and development became an integral part of the comprehensive approach: 
“the connection between security and development is therefore an underlying 
principle in […] an EU comprehensive approach”.60 The nexus underpins the 
integrated approach since it involves the integration of previously separate tools with 
separate decision-making mechanisms to achieve an overarching aim, as stipulated 
in the EUGS: “Through CSDP, development, and dedicated financial instruments, we 
will blend top-down and bottom-up efforts fostering the building blocks of sustainable 
statehood rooted in local agency.”61 
 
Qualified success? The security-development nexus in Mali since 2011 
Undeniably, a significant shift has taken place concerning the security-development 
nexus in Mali. Particularly according to the first criteria of success set out in this paper, 
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the extent to which the EU’s tools have become more integrated, overcoming 
sectoral silos to produce outcomes of added value, the EU has had significant success 
through the security-development nexus. The roles of DG DEVCO and the EU 
Delegation have altered drastically since their initial engagement in 2013, and 
especially since the 2011 Sahel Strategy. EU action in Mali was initially focused on 
‘traditional’ forms of development assistance.62 The only security-related projects the 
EU had funded through development tools before 2011 were projects on human 
trafficking through the Instrument for Stability (IfS, now the Instrument Contributing to 
Stability and Peace IcSP) and the EDF’s funding of the security architecture of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).63 The Sahel Strategy was an 
important step. As Lopez Lucia argues, it was an experiment in creating a “‘real’ 
foreign policy strategy, mixing instruments and driven by the EU’s strategic interests”.64 
It featured four lines of action under one structure (development, security, political 
and military), announcing that “security and development in the Sahel cannot be 
separated”.65  
In 2015, the security-development nexus in Mali was transformed. First, the 
security situation in the centre of Mali deteriorated, especially in the Mopti region.66 
Second, the refugee ‘crisis’ in Europe drew attention to Mali as a ‘country of origin’. 
As discussed, the EUTF was an outcome of the Valletta Process which could also be 
deployed quickly to react to the instability in the centre of Mali, whereas the EU had 
previously focussed on the north.67 United around the aim of tackling the causes of 
migration, the EUTF has brought together actors normally working in different silos to 
achieve different ends.68 For the first time, large quantities of money handled by DG 
DEVCO were mobilised on security issues.69 These efforts involved over €209 million 
across 12 projects to strengthen state and internal security forces.70 Making this 
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instrument work required intense dialogue involving experts in the EU Delegation and 
DG DEVCO, which was a huge organisational shift.71 Representatives from DG DEVCO 
increasingly attended meetings in the EU Delegation on security, which never 
happened before 2015.72 Furthermore, EUTF projects and security-development 
synergies were supported by EU member states who realised the utility of quickly 
mobilisable financial instruments in responding to crises.73 Thus, the security-
development nexus helped integrate member states as well as EU instruments into EU-
wide action in Mali.  
The IcSP, with a shorter-term stabilisation mandate in immediate post-conflict 
environments, also played a part in Mali after 2015. It now funds 12 projects at €30.5 
million, which focus on building trust between the Malian state and society.74 One of 
its most prominent programmes, Panorama Corsec, brought together DG DEVCO, the 
EU Delegation and EUCAP Sahel Mali to improve relations between the population in 
the centre and internal security forces.75 Even the EDF, one of the EU’s most 
‘traditional’ development tools, increasingly addressed security concerns: the €615 
million provided to Mali puts aside €280 million for reforming the state through 
structural reforms.76 Crucially, the budget support provided under this funding is 
dependent on indicators linked to progress in SSR, which is the mandate of the CSDP 
missions.77  
The change from 2015 to 2017 is best symbolised by the visit of DG DEVCO Director 
General Stefano Manservisi to Mali to meet with the Chiefs of Staff for the armed 
forces in Bamako in June 2017.78 This was the first time DG DEVCO had attended such 
a meeting with security officials in a state like Mali.79 They discussed progress in the G5 
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Sahel Joint Force and ministries of defence in the region as well as within Mali on how 
the two could work together.80 These meetings continued, for instance in February 
2019 when DG DEVCO met with Chiefs of Staff of Sahelian armed forces to coordinate 
on security issues in the region.81 In 2016, Lopez Lucia argued that institutional power 
struggles were taking place between the EEAS, which was willing to integrate all tools 
into a unified external strategy, and DG DEVCO, which resisted and wanted to keep 
development apolitical.82 Yet this confrontation, at least in Mali, is coming to an end 
and there is widespread acceptance that security and development tools are 
inextricably linked. Contacts between DG DEVCO and security personnel in the EU 
Delegation and CSDP missions were rare before 2015. Yet they now work together on 
a daily basis.  
 
How strategic is the EUTF?  
As highlighted, the EUTF is a key instrument operationalising the security-development 
nexus. However, it is also a short-term ‘emergency’ instrument with ambition limited to 
tackling the causes of migration. Moreover, whilst the EUTF cooperates with CSDP 
missions, it sits outside the EU’s existing security apparatuses which means it does not 
have to be entirely compliant with the rules of the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which 
are more restrictive on approving security-related development aid programmes.83 
While a key advantage of the EUTF is its ability to mobilise considerable sums of money 
quickly, it does not set clear strategic long-term aims. Thus, against the second, more 
stringent criterion of ‘success’ for the integrated approach set out in this paper, 
whether the integration of tools has enabled the EU to become more strategic as an 
actor, the EU’s security-development nexus’ achievements have been limited. 
The EUTF programme GAR-SI Sahel is an illustrative example of this. GAR-SI is 
one of the largest EUTF programmes in Mali that mobilises significant sums of money 
(€41.6 million across six countries).84 DG DEVCO sets its strategic direction, however it 
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is implemented by Spanish training forces.85 Typically of EUTF projects, its steering 
committee brings together DG DEVCO, the EEAS, the relevant EU Delegations as well 
as the member states’ security services and other partners.86 GAR-SI trains intervention 
units to improve response capacity at border areas: in Mali they trained Forces 
Spéciales Anti-terroristes et de Sécurité.87 The border forces built up by GAR-SI in Mali 
sit outside of established EU structures for long-term security. While the strategic 
document outlining GAR-SI’s mandate emphasises the necessity of avoiding 
duplication with other tools such as CSDP missions, there is no sense that GAR-SI and 
CSDP missions have integrated strategic aims.88 Indeed, interviewees highlighted the 
separateness of GAR-SI and CSDP missions, perceiving GAR-SI as a stand-alone tool 
used for border management.89 This is hardly the integrated, strategic approach 
outlined in 2016.  
The EUTF’s Strategic Board in DG DEVCO set out four “strategic lines of action” for 
North Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad, and the Horn of Africa: creating employment 
opportunities, “strengthening resilience of communities”, improving migration 
management and improving governance to prevent conflict and forced migration.90 
As of April 2018, six strategic aims for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa were also 
created: “return and reintegration”, “refugees management”, “securitization of 
documents”, “anti-trafficking measures”, “essential stabilization efforts in the Horn of 
Africa and the Sahel”, and “migration dialogues”.91 Some of these aims are the same 
as those in the Sahel Strategy, including a commitment to good governance. Yet the 
EUTF has a shorter-term focus on border management than other EU tools. In this way, 
the EUTF is a reactive rather than a strategic tool.  
Another indicator that the EU’s security-development nexus is limited in its 
strategic impacts is the scale of EU funding for the G5 Sahel Joint Force through the 
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APF. The APF is a long-term tool funded by DG DEVCO to create effective African 
peace and security architecture.92 The G5 Sahel, with its slogan “security and 
development” seemed like an effective way for the EU to promote a security-
development nexus on a longer-term timeline.93 However, the G5 Sahel has largely 
abandoned its commitment to development, with the Joint Force mirroring the 
counter-terrorism focus of international partners such as France.94 Concerns have 
been expressed about whether the G5 Sahel has a durable plan to stabilise the region 
or even whether it has decided which militias it opposes.95 Nevertheless, the EU still 
gave €50 million the G5 Sahel in 2017-18 and in 2018 pledged an additional €125 
million.96 This ‘obsession’ with promoting the G5 Sahel is damaging to the EU’s long-
term ambition to promote security and development in Mali as intrinsically linked.97 
The G5 Sahel’s focus on counterterrorism and borders rather than on underlying 
development issues as root causes of instability highlights how the EU is often focused 
on Europe’s internal security rather than a tailor-made solution for stability in Mali.  
Ultimately, many EU actors in Mali tend to see the security-development nexus 
as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. Personnel in the Commission 
became involved in security in a meaningful way when Mali transformed from a 
country where the EU purely focused on development efforts into a zone of instability 
where development tools were securitised. It is telling that, when questioned on the 
EUTF’s achievements, one interviewee highlighted that these were not the point: “We 
are constructing the European Union [through the EUTF]… in doing so, we are putting 
the EU in a position to be recognised as a security actor, which it was not four years 
ago.”98 The strategic impact of tools is not always prioritised; the EU instead aspires to 
be taken seriously as a security actor. However, if the EU is to become a strategic 
actor it cannot proceed in this manner. Dismantling bureaucratic silos will not make 
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the EU a fully integrated crisis management actor if there is no strategic direction.99 
Real change has undoubtedly taken place, with synergies between security and 
development being created. Nevertheless, through the EU’s ad hoc focus on 
migration and short-term security aims, an integrated approach in a strategic sense is 
lacking.  
Together, synergies between civilian and military instruments and security and 
development instruments form the basis of the integrated approach. However, a 
crucial new element was brought to prominence through the integrated approach: 
integrating action at all phases of the conflict cycle.  
 
Stabilisation, governance and the integrated multi-phased approach in Mali: 
What change, what added value? 
The multi-phased aspect of the integrated approach is a key innovation made by the 
EUGS, and Mali has been a testing ground in the EU’s efforts to integrate action at all 
stages of the conflict cycle. The stabilisation action under Article 28 TEU was set up to 
aid the Malians reconstruct their administration following an escalation of violence in 
the centre. Combined with EU attempts to integrate longer-term prevention initiatives 
to existing action, such as solving communal tensions that may lead to violence, it 
forms the basis of an integrated ‘multi-phased’ approach. Integrating action at all 
phases of a conflict was not a priority until the 2016 EUGS.100 This set out an ambition 
for the EU to act:  
at all stages of the conflict cycle. We will invest in prevention, resolution and 
stabilisation, and avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts 
elsewhere.101  
Stabilisation was a key focus within this area: “where the prospect of stabilisation 
arises, the EU must enable legitimate institutions to rapidly deliver basic services and 
security to local populations”.102 A desire to act in fragile, immediate post-conflict 
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environments and to bridge this action with existing efforts such as longer-term 
development programmes is clear: “we will therefore seek to bridge gaps in our 
response between an end of violence and long-term recovery.”103 Acting in a 
coherent manner at every phase of the conflict cycle pushes the EU further into the 
international security domain, developing its security actorness. This new aspect of the 
integrated approach is one of the most ambitious because it necessitates wider multi-
phased synergies rather than simply synergies between sectors. 
In this way, the idea behind Article 28 was to fill a gap by intervening in an 
immediate post-conflict stabilisation environment, a phase of the conflict cycle in 
which the EU was not usually involved.104 The centre of Mali thus became a testing 
ground for the Article 28 programme. In a country with strong EU presence, the 
security situation had deteriorated by 2017 with an outbreak of jihadist violence in the 
centre, when most international peacekeeping efforts were focused on managing 
security in the north.105 The HR/VP triggered Article 28 which led to the deployment of 
a group of 12 experts in governance, selected by the member states, to central Mali. 
These experts would help the local government rebuild administrative structures and 
improve the ability of Malian authorities to coordinate with each other. They would 
assist the Malian government implement PSIRC, the “Plan de Sécurisation Integré des 
Régions du Centre”, which was their answer to solving the crisis in the centre of Mali in 
the long run. PSIRC attempted an integrated approach, with four pillars: security, 
governance, development and strategic communication.106 
Article 28 was put into operation by PRISM, the principal structure for 
operationalising the EU’s multi-phased approach. The name PRISM itself “Prevention 
of Conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation 
and Mediation” integrates phases of the conflict cycle that previously the EU saw as 
separate and time-limited. PRISM acted as a permanent working group for 
consultation on how to achieve an integrated approach, reporting to the Deputy 
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Secretary General for CSDP and Crisis Response.107 In an effort to increase its visibility 
in EU structures, PRISM assumed its most significant role so far: operational control of 
the Article 28 stabilisation action (EUSTAMS) in Mali as a critical step in operationalising 
the multi-phased approach.108  
Expectations were high for EUSTAMS; EU officials deemed it “a great tool to 
operationalise the [EU’s] integrated approach”.109 Some analysts even argued it had 
the potential to replace CSDP missions.110 Yet since its inception, EUSTAMS was 
hampered by strategic and operational problems. On the ground, Article 28 was not 
perceived as furthering the EU’s overall strategy: as one EU official argued: “no one 
knows what this thing did.”111 The action put in place small programmes to stabilise 
the central region. For instance, working in Mopti and Ségou, the experts deployed 
by Article 28 established workshops for local lawmakers to help implement PSIRC and 
improve communication between regional and central governments.112 However, 
the stabilisation action ended in early 2019, having achieved few concrete results in 
the centre of Mali. The failure of EUSTAMS tells a similar story about civil-military 
synergies and the security-development nexus in Mali. An effort was made to create 
institutional innovations, experimenting with a new instrument. Yet limited 
consideration was paid the role Article 28 should play in an overall strategy.  
There were three key reasons EUSTAMS had a limited impact. First, echoing its 
problems of implementing PARSEC, the EU had not taken into consideration the 
severity of the security situation on the ground. Islamist attacks and intercommunal 
violence had increased, and in 2018 more than 300 civilians lost their lives in 
communal violence in central and northern Mali.113 The EU had underestimated 
security concerns in the centre which had been deteriorating for years and the 
security situation in Mopti and Ségou, where EUSTAMS was working, was far too fragile 
for post-conflict stabilisation to begin.114 Thus, the experts involved in EUSTAMS could 
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not live in the centre and had to commute from Bamako.115 As a result, they had little 
contact with local government and civil society,  and the experts worked with weak 
public administrations both in the regions and in Bamako.116 Moreover, a one-year 
mandate for the stabilisation action was insufficient time to implement reforms.117 The 
result was a top-down effort rather than a locally owned security-governance 
process.  
Second, there were organisational difficulties in the implementation of the 
plan. Article 28 was driven by the HR/VP and controlled by the EEAS, a chance to 
expand the HR/VP’s mandate to conduct security policy.118 However, the initiative 
lacked support from member states, existing staff in the CSDP missions and the EU 
Delegation. The function of the stabilisation action had not been adequately 
explained to these important actors. Member states lacked the same level of 
operational control they had over CSDP missions and were thus reluctant to recruit 
the experts needed for the mission. In a striking display of a lack of buy-in, only half of 
the experts needed were ever recruited by the member states.119 On the CSDP side, 
staff of EUCAP Sahel Mali were reluctant to help implement the plan as they believed 
it infringed on their own activities, and the relationship the stabilisation action should 
have with the CSDP missions was not clearly defined.120 Furthermore, many at the EU 
Delegation were sceptical of the plan as they believed they did not have the 
resources to help the Article 28 team.121 There were frustrations with the way Article 28 
was operationalised “in a top-down way”.122 Thus, for an action that was supposed to 
epitomise the integrated approach – swift, decisive action being taken by a 
centralised authority (the HR/VP) – the result was instead the deployment of a team 
of experts detached from existing efforts, unable to draw on expertise in the field. 
Yet particularly concerning were the diverging interpretations of EUSTAMS 
within the EU institutions. While those working on the ground were sceptical of the 
extent to which the action helped stabilise Mali at all, officials in Brussels showed a 
surprising disregard for the strategic impact of EUSTAMS. Some officials in Brussels did 
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not see Article 28’s lack of concrete achievements in Mali as a failure, but a chance 
to learn in testing out a new EU external action tool.123 They saw Article 28 in Mali as 
an end in itself as a way to learn lessons so the action could perhaps be used 
elsewhere in the future.124 These diverging interpretations highlight the gap between 
the ambitions from Brussels to ‘create’ the EU as a security actor in Mali.125 EUSTAMS’s 
activation was not driven by needs on the ground, which clearly were not favourable, 
but a desire from Brussels to ‘test’ a new piece of institutional machinery.  
Finally, the programme which Article 28 was mandated to help the Malian 
government implement, PSIRC, struggled to generate meaningful governance 
reform. Implementing the plan required stabilisation in the centre in response to a 
crisis, governance and building trust between communities, and a more long-term 
focus on economic projects.126 Yet PSIRC was implemented by Mali’s Ministry of 
Security and predominantly made recommendations concerning the deployment of 
Mali’s security forces, rather than a whole–of-government approach. Its plans on 
strategic communication and engagement were limited, as was PSIRC’s socio-
economic reconstruction programme.127 EUSTAMS had no mandate other than to 
help the Malian government implement PSIRC, even if the plan was myopic.128 Thus, 
it was intrinsically limited in what it could achieve from the start.  
The stabilisation action was supposed to be the showpiece of a new integrated 
multi-phased approach enacted through PRISM and EUSTAMS, however the EU 
lacked a long-term strategic plan behind the triggering of Article 28. One EU official 
was sceptical that EUSTAMS had achieved any strategic impact: “I'm not sure about 
the multi-phased approach. I think we have been running more after developments 
than anything else.”129 A lack of appreciation of the conditions on the ground led to 
poor strategic impact of the action. At the heart of the failure was a problematic 
attitude on the EU’s part, viewing the security situation in Mali as a ‘laboratory of 
experimentation’. Arguably the real motivation behind launching Article 28 was to try 
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out a new instrument rather than an action based on a clear-eyed assessment of the 
situation on the ground that would advance a coherent strategy for stability in the 
country. The hostility of other actors such as the EU Delegation is not a positive 
indicator that it was part of an integrated strategy. The Article 28 episode highlights 
the introspectiveness of the integrated approach in the country, tending to reflect the 
internal dynamics and institutional ends of the EU rather than the long-term 
stabilisation of Mali.  
Returning to the criteria of success outlined in this paper, in the ‘multi-phased’ 
aspect of the integrated approach in Mali, the EU has achieved success in the first 
criterion, integrating tools and actors, without success with regard to the second 
criterion, improving the EU’s ability to be a strategic security actor and effect the 
structural changes necessary to stabilise Mali.  
 
Conclusion: The future of the ‘laboratory of experimentation’ 
The first section of this paper referred to an EEAS working paper which summarised the 
EU’s integrated approach to security in the Sahel:  
The EU integrated approach is a new way of working which aims at setting a 
clear overarching EU political objective which can be achieved by using and 
combining the different tools at our disposal.130 
Tellingly, it was never articulated what precisely this overarching political objective is, 
nor did any of the interviewees agree on one. 
Overall, how successfully and in what ways is the EU implementing an 
integrated approach to the conflict in Mali? It is clear that the EU has created 
meaningful institutional innovations, breaking down inter-agency silos particularly 
regarding the security-development nexus. However, these innovations were made 
in the absence of a clear set of strategic aims to unify CSDP missions, EUTF projects, 
other EU security and development instruments and EU member states. Institutional 
innovations such as Article 28 and the PARSEC programme are viewed as ends in 
themselves – testing new tools for use in future interventions and using Mali as a 
‘laboratory of experimentation’ to construct itself as a security actor. The tools are 
utilised to serve short-term, migration-focused aims. This laboratory approach has 
                                                 
130 European External Action Service, “The EU Integrated Approach in the Sahel”, op. cit., p. 2. 
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been prioritised over a sustainable strategy for the future of Mali.131 Ironically, the EU’s 
most successful means of integrating the actions of EU agencies and actors, the EUTF, 
is also the most short-term and the least strategic, as an ‘emergency’ fund to curb 
migration to Europe.132 The EUGS put the slogan ‘shared vision, common action’ at 
the heart of its message. In the case of Mali, the latter is well on the way to being 
achieved, but without the former. 
Mali remains one of the countries with which the EU is most engaged in terms of 
crisis management and SSR. There is thus a clear need for integrated strategic 
leadership or else there is a risk of a lack of coherence, with each agency or tool 
performing an individual task rather than working together to produce added value. 
Compared to the Horn of Africa, Mali is often used as an example of somewhere the 
comprehensive and/or integrated approach works well.133 Yet we must ask at what 
cost the EU is experimenting with new inter-organisational and institutional synergies. 
As one EU official argued: “We have every single instrument in motion in Mali. Every 
time there is a new initiative, a new idea, we always pick Mali.”134 The EU’s ‘laboratory’ 
for external action is situated in one of the most fragile, violent and conflict-stricken 
regions in the world. This is hardly an appropriate place for the EU to host experiments, 
particularly if programmes such as Article 28 make little progress towards achieving 
stability for the country.  
This finding has implications for the analysis of EU action in conflicts beyond Mali. 
The EU is still in the process of developing its external action tools in fragile regions. In 
this sense, there will always be a danger that the EU will use external conflicts as 
opportunities to assert its presence as a security actor. The EUTF also operates in North 
and East Africa and is swiftly becoming an integral tool in EU foreign policy.135 Yet 
whilst this fund undoubtedly creates synergies between actors in the implementation 
phase, it is an ad hoc method that operates outside of any EU integrated strategy. 
Further research on the integrated approach in other conflict zones where the EU 
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engages, for instance Somalia, would be of interest to whether the findings presented 
here can be corroborated.136 
It is important to relativise the EU’s failure in creating an overarching strategy. 
The security problems in Mali and the Sahel in general are intractable and deep-
rooted. Dealing with the underlying causes of insecurity involves issues as complex as 
food insecurity, climate change, international organised crime networks, unemploy-
ment, demographic change and ethno-religious tensions.137 Furthermore, the EU is 
dealing with a Malian state which still perpetuates the corruption that caused the 
unrest in 2012, and sees little incentive to undertake comprehensive SSR that would 
disrupt existing networks of power and patronage.138 The EU cannot impose a change 
of approach against the will of the Malian government. Thus, when systematic 
change is so difficult to effect and drawing up a long-term strategy to tackle poor 
governance is politically sensitive, it may be understandable that the EU would 
choose to draw on existing strengths to implement short-term migration-focused 
projects that will be popular domestically with EU member states. This is more readily 
achievable than tackling the root causes of the conflict which include corruption and 
human rights abuses on the part of the Malian state.  
However, using Mali as a ‘laboratory’ in which the EU can construct itself as an 
integrated security actor does not aid long-term stability in the country, particularly 
when the security situation, especially in the north and the centre of Mali, continues 
to deteriorate.139 The integrated approach ultimately was intended in the EUGS as a 
means to an end – making the EU effective in crisis management – not purely as an 
end in itself to solidify the role of the EU as an integrated crisis manager. Thus, if the EU 
is serious about helping achieve long-term stability in Mali, it needs to create long-
term, political, and structural objectives instead of an ad hoc projects approach.  
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Ultimately, this tension between the EU’s desire to project itself as a security actor 
through integrated action in Mali (using the integrated approach as an end in itself) 
and using the integrated approach as a means to an end (to make the EU a more 
effective crisis manager) could be borne out of a contradiction at the highest levels 
of EU leadership. HR/VP Mogherini has argued that the EU should be “generously 
selfish” with regards to stabilising Africa,140 and the EUSR to the Sahel, Ángel Losada, 
stated “the security in the Sahel is the security for Europe”.141 This is further reinforced 
by the EU’s ‘internal-external security nexus’.142 Whilst these ideas highlight EU interests 
in the stability of the region, they do not facilitate the construction of a long-term 
strategic plan rooted in Malian needs.143 Instead, these views encourage a short-term 
focus on issues directly affecting Europe such as terrorism and migration. The EU has, 
within the confines of counter-terrorism and migration management, has managed 
to break down institutional silos and experiment with new crisis management 
instruments. However, the EU needs to tackle the challenge that the integrated 
approach really presents: creating an EU that is capable of more than reactive 
responses, but can help effect lasting peace and resilient societies. Focusing on these 
needs rather than using short-term actions that superficially combat politically-salient 
issues in order to construct itself as a security actor is much more likely to prevent Mali 
from sliding into further instability in the future. It could also lend the EU far greater 
credibility if it chooses to intervene in conflicts in Africa in the future.  
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